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 Executive summary 
The report of the UN’s Panel on Peace Operations in August 2000 her-
alded a period of drastic change. Over the next fifteen years the organi-
sation launched new ‘multi-dimensional’ missions in a dozen different 
countries, and handed them an array of unfamiliar new responsibilities 
related to the protection of civilians and ‘early peacebuilding’. These 
new expectations led to a five-fold increase in the average size and 
budget of individual operations. They also presented a steep learning 
curve for managers, who were challenged to do three things simultane-
ously: 
Learn new tasks in real time. Extensive trial-and-error in the early 
going gave way progressively to detailed policy guidance. The evolu-
tion over time of mandatory policies, lessons learned and best practices 
suggest several practical lessons about how the guidance task can best 
be approached. The longer-term perspective also indicates several com-
peting interests that must be kept in proper balance: task-level versus 
strategic-level effectiveness; and backward-looking ‘best practices’ 
versus open-ended questions where the answers are simply not known. 
Develop viable country strategies. The major determinant of peace 
operations’ success, insofar as they can control it, has been the ability 
to understand and adapt to the context on the ground. Policy-makers 
have accordingly given high priority to better analysis and planning, 
with rapid iterations of guidance on both mission start-up and country-
level decision processes. Over time this reflects two major trends. The 
first is away from linear planning, towards a more dynamic concept of 
strategic management. The second is opening up an inward-looking, 
production-type model to encompass much greater stakeholder en-
gagement.  
Build a learning infrastructure. This has been a long-term enterprise 
focused on Headquarters policy capacity, peer-peer knowledge-sharing 
and basic-training efforts (in roughly that order). The major lesson in 
this regard has been the difficulty of matching up external models with 
the UN’s highly specific management environment. The initiatives that 
have succeeded are those that paid close attention to stakeholder rela-
tionships, and that drew effectively on external partners to compensate 
for structural gaps.  
Each of these challenges is complex, and the managerial responses 
have been spread out over a long period and across many different in-
terlocutors. Yet it is possible to suggest some over-arching lessons 
about ‘best-fit’ approaches. The key points here are:  
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(i) Where to focus. All three areas must be held in balance. Organi-
sational-level doctrine is important, but it cannot substitute for 
context-specific adaptation. And both will require investment in 
learning processes and resources. 
(ii) How to execute. Learning initiatives succeed when they attract 
the buy-in of financial and political stakeholders, and are com-
patible with UN peacekeeping’s peculiar operating systems. 
These are design parameters that must be taken into account 
from the outset.  
(iii) What to prioritise. Multilateral peace operations are perhaps 
uniquely vulnerable to forgetting their own history. This puts a 
premium on practical approaches to identify recurring challen-
ges; capture relevant experience; and quickly disseminate the 
findings. 
 Introduction 
In 1988 the UN deployed a small peace operation in Angola to verify 
the withdrawal of Cuban troops. Over time it was reconfigured to sup-
port successive ceasefires and peace agreements between the national 
government and the National Union for Total Independence of Angola. 
Its mandate comprised good offices in support of negotiations; super-
vising the disengagement of military forces; monitoring the neutrality 
of Angolan police; supporting humanitarian service delivery; and ob-
servation of elections. To achieve these tasks the operation’s authorised 
strength peaked (briefly!) at 3,250 troops, and its annual budget at 
USD 175m, just before it was drawn down in 1999 in response to re-
newed hostilities. 
In that same year, the first military observers of a new UN operation 
for the Democratic Republic of the Congo arrived in-country. They were 
initially charged with monitoring of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, 
agreed between four major armed factions and the recognised govern-
ment. Over time this evolved through support to the establishment of 
national political institutions, the protection of civilians ‘at imminent 
risk of violence’, and the ‘restoration of state authority’ in the eastern 
region of the DRC. The operation’s authorised strength grew to 27,000 
personnel, split over a hundred deployment locations and with a fleet 
of sixty aircraft. Annual budgets grew apace to over USD 1.5bn per 
year, with total spending up to 2015 at about $19bn. The mission 
weathered renewed outbursts of serious fighting in 2003-04, 2008-09 
and 2012 and indeed in the last case was stiffened with an ‘interven-
tion brigade’ tasked with offensive operations against armed groups. 
These two peace operations faced similar political challenges and 
physical terrain, at least in the early going. Yet the policy response was 
almost unrecognisably different. These differences reflect in miniature 
the major trends for UN peacekeeping in the twenty-first century. In 
total, the organisation has deployed seventeen distinct peace opera-
tions since the Angolan mission was wound down in 1999. No fewer 
than thirteen of these were given complex statebuilding mandates; and 
a like number were tasked to protect civilians at risk of violence.1 This 
has brought with it a substantial increase in the overall peacekeeping 
footprint. From 2000 to 2015 the average annual budget of current 
operations increased from USD 100m to USD 500m; average author-
                                                          
1  That is, excluding reconfigured operations in Timor-Leste, the DRC, the Central 
African Republic and Haiti.  
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ised personnel roughly tripled; and average duration stretched from 
well under fifteen years to nearly twenty-five.2  
This paper asks how the UN built a bridge from operations like that 
in Angola, to ones like that in the DRC. It aims to synthesize the organi-
sational learning challenges, and managerial responses, that have ac-
companied peacekeeping’s very rapid evolution over the last fifteen 
years. 
In this regard, a convenient place to start is the Brahimi Report of 
August 2000 (formally, the UN Panel on Peace Operations).3 This was a 
landmark review that came at a critical moment for the organisation. 
Rwanda and Bosnia had demonstrated that catastrophes could occur 
notwithstanding the presence of ‘blue helmet’ peacekeepers. The fledg-
ling operation in Sierra Leone had just been rescued by British military 
intervention, while the first tentative steps in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo had also been greeted by serious fighting.  
It is thus no exaggeration to say that the spectre of failure lurks 
throughout the document. The report’s authors warned in stark terms 
that peace operations were increasingly deployed into crisis situations 
without exit strategies to leave them. Doing better implied a change 
agenda focused ‘not only on politics and strategy, but also and perhaps 
even more so on operational and organizational areas of need’.4 The 
recommendations that followed were a fair summary of the major 
learning challenges for UN peacekeeping as it encountered rapidly 
shifting expectations. In essence, the organisation was being asked to: 
Learn new tasks. The historically symbolic role of UN military person-
nel had given way to the active use of force to defend ‘themselves, oth-
er mission components and the mission’s mandate’.5 Alongside this, 
operations were now expected to act as ‘early peacebuilders’, with a 
particular focus on reinforcing host government institutions. In both 
cases it was critical to discover what worked, and ‘value added’ by 
peace operations as distinct from other institutions. 
Create viable country strategies. The new mandates also meant a 
steep learning curve for individual operations. It rapidly became clear 
that what effective protection and peacebuilding looked like was irre-
ducibly context-specific, and that the main condition of success would 
be effective adaptation to local condition.  
                                                          
2  For data see Peace Operations Review, ’10 trends in peace operations’, 2015, at 
peaceoperationsreview.org; Quick ID, ‘Peacekeeping agendas dataset’, Rethink 
Fragility, 2013. 
3  United Nations, ‘Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations’, August 
2000, UN Doc A/55/305-S/2000/809 
4  Ibid, p viii.  
5  Ibid, p9. 
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Build a learning infrastructure. As UN peace operations grew in scale 
and complexity, it was clear that the improvised operating culture that 
had sustained earlier peace operations would no longer suffice. There 
was an acute need for systems and processes to capture the rapidly 
accumulating experience; to systematically reflect on its lessons; and 
to make the conclusions widely available. 
The following sections unpack the UN’s efforts to meet these chal-
lenges over the fifteen years between the Brahimi Report and the next 
comprehensive review of peace operations, the High-Level Panel of 
2015. In each case we ask and aim to answer three questions:  
 What were the practical needs?  
 What were the managerial responses, and how did they evolve 
over time? 
 What are some useful takeaways, or ‘lessons learned about 
learning’? 
  
  
 1. New tasks 
1.1 The learning challenge 
In 1993, a future Assistant Secretary-General for Strategic Planning, 
John Ruggie, had warned of a ‘doctrinal void’ around the re-purposing 
of a ‘traditional peacekeeping mechanism’ in Cambodia and the Bal-
kans.6 His comment proved prescient as the end of the decade ap-
proached. For the most striking difference between the peace opera-
tions in Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo was their 
scope of work. The latter attempted much more; stayed much longer; 
and employed vastly greater resources. 
Underlying this were two major changes in the expected role of UN 
peace operations. These confronted the organisation with tasks that 
were essentially new, and moreover had to be worked out in real time.  
The first group of tasks concerned exit strategies. In 1999 the Secu-
rity Council mandated the establishment of interim administrations in 
both Kosovo and Timor Leste, and charged them to help develop sus-
tainable local institutions for security, police, justice, and public ad-
ministration. This announced a pivot to ‘state building’ as a corner-
stone of UN strategy, in essence the belief that ‘achieving security and 
development in societies emerging from civil war partly depends upon 
the existence of capable, autonomous and legitimate institutions’.7 
Once it occurred, the shift was dramatic. Between 2000 and 2015 the 
Security Council has instructed eleven subsequent peace operations to 
help strengthen security, rule of law and democratic institutions.  
In the early going, these operations had to improvise. Both interim 
administrations were marked by serious gaps in expertise and unclear 
transitional strategy, with the head of mission for Timor-Leste famously 
penning a memo entitled ‘How not to run a country’.8 Ad hoc ap-
proaches to the security sector came in for particularly harsh criticism 
after the Timorese police service imploded in 2003-04.9 Other contem-
                                                          
6  Ruggie JG, ‘Wandering in the void: Charting the UN’s new strategic role’, Foreign 
Affairs, Nov/Dec 1993. 
7  Paris R and Sisk T, ‘The dilemmas of statebuilding: Confronting the contradictions 
of post-war peace operations’, Routledge, 2008, p2. 
8  Viera de Mello S, ‘How not to run a country: Lessons for the UN from Kosovo and 
East Timor’, internal memorandum (undated). Cited in, for example, Harris V and 
Goldsmith A, ‘Security, development and nation-building in Timor-Leste: A cross-
sectoral assessment’, Routledge, 2012. 
9  United Nations, ‘Report of the joint assessment mission carried out by the govern-
ment of Timor-Leste, UNMISET, UNDP and development partner countries for the 
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porary studies of work with security and rule of law institutions like-
wise found a lack of clear objectives, and behind this no ‘theory of 
change’ for how such work would contribute to the eventual drawdown 
of the peace operation.10 
Concurrent with all this was the equally rapid growth of protection 
mandates. Here the pivotal moment was also in 1999, when the Secu-
rity Council mandated the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone to 
‘afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical vio-
lence’.11 Versions of this language now apply to some 95% of person-
nel deployed in UN peace operations. Over the years they have con-
fronted widely varying conditions, with the relatively simple case of 
Sierra Leone (71,000km2, pop 6m) set alongside those of the DRC 
(2,345,000 km2, pop. 65m) and the Central African Republic (630,000 
km2, pop. 5m). 
It is fair to say that policy in this area evolved on an ad hoc basis. 
The main driver was ‘the impact of a series of critical challenges to the 
various missions on the ground’,12 including flare-ups of large-scale 
violence in Sierra Leone (2000-01), DRC (2003-04), and Cote d’Ivoire 
(2005-06). As late as 2009, a comprehensive independent study found 
‘no evidence’ of an agreed concept of operations to guide planning. In 
practice this made for inconsistent understandings of ‘who is to be pro-
tected, from what kinds of actors and threats, and by what means’.13 
The task was complicated by sourcing of military personnel from doz-
ens of different contributors, each with their own doctrine and operat-
ing culture. 
                                                          
Timor-Leste Police Service’, UNMISET, 2003; Rees E, ‘Under pressure: FALINTIL – 
Forcas de Defensa de Timor Leste. Three decades of defense force development in 
Timor-Leste (1974-2004), Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forc-
es, 2004; International Crisis Group, ‘Resolving Timor-Leste’s crisis’, 2006; Smith J 
et al, ‘Enhancing United Nations capacity for post-conflict policing and rule of law’, 
Henry L. Stimson Centre, 2007. 
10  Dahrendof N et al, ‘A review of peace operations: A case for change’, King’s College 
London, March 2003; United Nations, ‘Lessons learned from United Nations peace-
keeping experiences in Sierra Leone’, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, September 
2003; United Nations, ‘Report of the Secretary-General: The rule of law and transi-
tional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies’, August 2004, UN Doc 
S/2004/616. 
11  SC Res 1270, 22 October 1999, UN Doc S/RES/1270, para. 14. For a concise over-
view see Holt V, Taylor G and Kelly M, ‘Protecting civilians in the context of UN 
peacekeeping operations’, Independent study jointly commissioned by the De-
partment of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office for the Coordination of Hu-
manitarian Affairs, November 2009, Pt II.1. 
12  Benner T, Mergenthaler S and Rotmann P, ‘The new world of UN peace operations: 
Learning to build peace?, Oxford University Press, 2011, p19.  
13  Holt V et al, ‘Protecting civilians’, above, ch 3. 
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1.2 Managerial responses 
Under acute operational pressure, early learning initiatives aimed 
simply to inventory the work that was already being attempted at field 
level. Early handbooks on civilian police doctrine (2000) and Multi-
Dimensional Peacekeeping Operations (2003) listed out common ele-
ments of the new mandates.14 These documents were rudimentary at 
best – the latter notes apologetically that it was ‘intended to provide 
general background’ for incoming staff, with a single paragraph each 
for issues like the protection of civilians and the disarmament, demobi-
lisation and reintegration (DDR) of combatants.  
Over time, there followed lessons-learned studies that mapped prac-
tices in a more systematic way across different operations in the field. 
These studies were prepared for increasingly well-defined thematic 
areas: security sector reform, judicial reform, corrections, protection of 
civilians and DDR, among others.15 At a practical level they were com-
missioned and managed by still-embryonic Headquarters policy teams 
configured along similar thematic lines, with the research itself typical-
ly conducted by external consultants. (We return to the mechanics of 
this in Part 3, below.) 
As confidence grew the Secretariat expanded its ambitions, seeking 
to go beyond descriptive accounts to endorse specific good practices. A 
set of 2008 Principles and Guidelines, nicknamed the Capstone Doc-
trine, aimed to delimit ‘core business’ and the proper division of labour 
between peace operations and other actors.16 Concurrently, newly 
staffed policy teams at Headquarters developed guidance notes, and 
often formal policies, for the same thematic areas. This included rewrit-
ten guidance for longstanding occupational categories such as civil 
affairs whose role had changed dramatically with the new multi-
dimensional mandates.17  
                                                          
14  United Nations, ‘Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping 
Operations’, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, December 2003; United Na-
tions, ‘United Nations Civilian Police Principles and Guidelines’, Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, 2000. 
15  United Nations, ‘Supporting national prison systems: Lessons learned and best 
practices for peacekeeping operations’, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 
December 2005; Carlson SN, ‘Legal and judicial rule of law work in multidimen-
sional peace operations: Lessons-learned study’, Department of Peacekeeping Op-
erations, 2006; Rees E, ‘Security sector reform (SSR) and peace operations: “Im-
provisation and confusion” from the field: External study’, Department of Peace-
keeping Operations, 2006; Holt et al, above; United Nations, ‘Second generation 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) practices in peace opera-
tions’, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, January 2010. 
16  United Nations, ‘United Nations peacekeeping operations: Principles and guide-
lines’, Department of Peacekeeping Operations / Department of Field Support, Jan-
uary 2008. 
17  United Nations, ‘Primer for justice components in multidimensional peace opera-
tions: Strengthening the rule of law’, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, De-
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These early initiatives proceeded at different rates, and looked 
slightly different, according to the human resources available at Head-
quarters in the different thematic areas. In most cases the guidance 
products themselves are now in their second or third generations, 
building on feedback from practitioners in field operations and outside 
experts.18 If we examine these documents over time, or ask those in-
volved, there are several clear trends: 
 Mandatory policies that set out purposes and principles for 
commonly recurring mandate tasks, in effect interpreting the 
quite general language used by the Security Council. These typ-
ically also set out minimum expectations for processes and out-
puts at the level of individual missions. 
 Supplementary guidelines on more-specific areas of work, e.g. 
capacity-building for host-country police; procedures for prison 
incident management; and tactical approaches to the protec-
tion of civilians.19 
 Less formal reference tools that set out tools, methodologies 
and practical examples for recurring areas of work. Much of the 
newest guidance bundled into user-friendly handbooks, with 
the intent that they are used more à la carte. 
 Greater focus on partnerships. Newer guidance is notable for its 
emphasis on integration with other pillars of the peace opera-
tion; how to productively engage with the host government and 
civil society; and how to engage with other international agen-
cies. 
                                                          
cember 2006; United Nations, ‘Policy directive: Prison support in UN peacekeeping 
operations’, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, December 2007; United Na-
tions, ‘Policy directive: Civil affairs’, Department of Peacekeeping Operations / De-
partment of Field Support, April 2008; United Nations, ‘DPKO/DFS lessons learned 
note on the protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping operations’, Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations / Department of Field Support, 2010. 
18  United Nations, ‘Civil affairs handbook’, Department of Peacekeeping Operations / 
Department of Field Support, February 2012; United Nations, ‘Handbook for judicial 
affairs officers in United Nations peacekeeping operations’, Department of Peace-
keeping Operations, June 2013; United Nations, ‘DPKO/DFS policy: The protection 
of civilians in United Nations peacekeeping’, Department of Peacekeeping Opera-
tions / Department of Field Support, April 2015. 
19  United Nations, ‘Guidelines: Police capacity-building and development’, Depart-
ment of Peacekeeping Operations / Department of Field Support, March 2017; 
United Nations, ‘Lessons Learned Report on the Joint Protection Team Mechanism 
in MONUSCO’, Department of Peacekeeping Operations / Department of Field Sup-
port / Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2013; United Nations, 
‘Prison Incident Management Handbook’, Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
/ Department of Field Support, 2013; United Nations, ‘The United Nations rule of 
law indicators: Implementation guide and project tools’, Department of Peacekeep-
ing Operations / Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2011. 
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 Recognition of the need for good contextual analysis. To take 
one striking example, the 2013 handbook for judicial affairs of-
ficers includes dozens of pages on national legal systems com-
pared to almost zero coverage in its 2006 predecessor. 
Alongside such ‘thematic’ work, it has also been essential to pay atten-
tion to cross-cutting issues. The most obvious candidate here was the 
renewal of the organisation’s field support processes. As the New Hori-
zons policy statement of 2009 noted drily, ‘administrative practices 
and financial management systems designed for a stable civil service 
secretariat now manage massive, complex field operations in some of 
the most difficult and remote environments in the world’.20 Major initi-
atives that followed included the Global Field Support Strategy (2010-
15); the 2011 review of Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict; 
and several initiatives for enterprise resource planning. These focused 
on re-engineering core systems and processes. Parallel workstreams 
aimed to professionalise core support functions and define standard-
ised approaches, much as for the ‘substantive’ tasks noted above. 
A third set of learning initiatives examined peace operations’ overall 
effectiveness, as (according to doctrine) ‘one part of a much broader 
international effort to help countries emerging from conflict’.21 These 
included a Working Group on Transition Issues; the Panel on System-
Wide Coherence; a string of reports on Peacebuilding in the Aftermath 
of Conflict issued by the Secretary-General’s office; and the High-Level 
Independent Panel on Peace Operations of 2015.22 Their recommenda-
tions touched on system-level issues such as integration of effort; fi-
nancing gaps; and the roles of the Security Council as policy-maker and 
the Secretariat as its advisor. 
1.3 Takeaways 
There is no doubt that UN peacekeeping has been handed a difficult set 
of challenges from 1999-2000 onwards. Protection and institution-
                                                          
20  United Nations, ‘A new partnership agenda: Charting a new horizon for UN peace-
keeping’, Department of Peacekeeping Operations / Department of Field Support, 
July 2009, p4. 
21  United Nations, ‘United Nations peacekeeping operations: Principles and guide-
lines’, above, pp22-3. 
22  United Nations, ‘Report of the UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues’, UN 
Development Group (UNDG), 2004; United Nations, ‘Delivering as One, Report of 
the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on System-wide Coherence’, UN Doc 
A/61/583, 2006. On the Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict series see: 
Statement by the President of the Security Council, 20 May 2008, UN Doc 
PRST/2008/16; United Nations, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding 
in the immediate aftermath of conflict’, June 2009, UN Doc A/63/881-S/2009/304. 
See also Security Council Report, ‘Update report No. 1: Peacebuilding’, April 2010; 
Security Council Report, ‘Update report No. 4: Peacebuilding: Institution building’, 
January 2011. 
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building mandates were new to the organisation, and had to be 
‘learned on the job’ in rapidly evolving environments. Under such cir-
cumstances, the sequence of initiatives noted above was a rational re-
sponse (even if their speed and quality was often criticised). 
At the same time, this was effectively a process of a trial-and-error. 
The organisation adjusted its approach incrementally as early products 
met criticism, or resistance. Among other possible lessons, the experi-
ence suggests the need to manage two basic tensions: 
(i) Tactical usefulness vs. strategic relevance 
Most learning efforts have been pitched at specific mandated tasks like 
judicial reform, the protection of civilians, or corrections. This is inevi-
table given the need for a practical division of labour, and to effectively 
‘backstop’ staff in these specific occupational roles in the field. Indeed, 
practitioners have often commented that these thematic categories are 
already much too abstract. Early guidance was roundly criticised for 
being unhelpfully broad and vague, given the complexity and sheer 
scope of the activities it encompassed.  
The response from policy-writers has been to focus on specific prac-
tical challenges, and to collate real-world examples of how they were 
approached. This has been reinforced through an emphasis in recent 
years on peer-peer interactions, to provide support on day-to-day tasks 
as they arrive (discussed further in Part 3 below). This is consistent 
with wider thinking on professional education, which tends to favour 
learning that can be immediately applied and adapted. 
Yet such an approach, by itself, is clearly inadequate. The report of 
the 2015 High-Level Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) was fiercely 
critical of operations designed according to ‘supply-driven templates’, 
i.e. matching the organisational division of labour at Headquarters ra-
ther than needs on the ground.23 In doing so the HIPPO panellists re-
flected views held widely within the Secretariat. They also echoed a 
long line of assessments by bilateral and multilateral agencies active in 
fragile states – as one influential joint study put it, that interventions 
tend to be ‘strategy-resistant, as if they need no justification because 
their worth is self-evident’.24  
                                                          
23  United Nations, ‘The challenge of sustaining peace: Report of the advisory group of 
experts for the 2015 review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture’, June 
2015. 
24  Smith D et al, ‘Towards a strategic framework for peacebuilding: Getting their act 
together’, Overview report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding, Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004. See also United Nations, ‘Inventory: United Na-
tions Capacities in Peacebuilding’, Executive Office of the Secretary-General, Sep-
tember 2006, p1; Patrick S and Brown K, ‘Greater than the sum of its parts? As-
sessing “whole of government” approaches to fragile states’, International Peace 
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The implication is simple: A holistic perspective is also needed. Or-
ganisational learning must continually assess the contribution of indi-
vidual lines of effort to ‘a secure environment that is self-sustaining’ as 
the Brahimi Report put it. In practice there is no obvious source for this 
perspective, with the Secretary-General describing the overall transi-
tion from conflict to peace as a ‘gaping hole in the United Nations insti-
tutional machinery’.25 One-off, ad hoc measures have thus played a 
crucial role. These have included external advisory groups of eminent 
personalities (the 2011 Review of Civilian Capacities; 2015’s High-
Level Panel); and occasional papers prepared through the executive 
office of the Department of Peacekeeping and the Secretary-General 
(New Horizons, Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict).  
(ii) Proven practices vs. unfamiliar challenges 
In 2002, the UN formed a task force aimed to map institutional compe-
tencies around criminal law and penal systems. This group included an 
alphabet soup of UN offices, agencies, funds and programs, and it 
worked for several years to document good practices and lessons 
learned. At the end of the process, the chairperson looked back and 
summarised bluntly that ‘no UN agency had developed experience or 
expertise in how to build adequate capacity’. In reality the need was to 
develop viable approaches to international assistance in these sensi-
tive, and not to locate ones that already existed.26 
This is a fair reflection of the wider experience with multi-dimensio-
nal peace operations. An initial focus on mapping ‘best practices’ was 
wholly appropriate: given the highly decentralised nature of UN opera-
tions, innovation could only happen in the field. Yet it is also clear that 
there are basic uncertainties, and gaps in knowledge, about key tasks. 
The 2011 Review of Civilian Capacities noted bluntly that in many cas-
es ‘the needed capacities are just not available’ within the UN system.27 
The current head of peacekeeping operations has conceded that ‘our 
expertise is not very deep in critical peacebuilding areas’, and his pre-
decessor that ‘we are still a long way from being able to provide credi-
ble responses on these technical issues’.28  
                                                          
Academy, 2007, p130; de Coning C, ‘The United Nations and the comprehensive 
approach’, Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS Report 2008:14. 
25  United Nations, ‘Report of the Secretary-General: In larger freedom: towards devel-
opment, security and human rights for all’, March 2005, UN Doc A/59/2005. 
26  O’Neill, ‘UN peacekeeping operations and rule of law programs’, in Hurwitz A and 
Huang R (eds) Civil war and the rule of law, Lynne Rienner, 2008. Quoted in Benner 
et al, ‘The new world of UN peace operations’, above, p128. 
27  United Nations, ‘Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict: Independent report of 
the senior advisory group’, March 2011. 
28  Le Roy A, ‘Keynote address: Managing “complexity”’, in Clement C and Smith AC 
(eds) Managing complexity: Political and managerial challenges in United Nations 
peace operations, International Peace Institute, 2009; Guéhenno JM, ‘The fog of 
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As this has become more apparent, policy products have become no-
tably less prescriptive. Recent policies and guidance put as much em-
phasis on country-level diagnostic work, including careful stakeholder 
engagement, as they do on specific ways of working. This is consistent 
with the broader international development literature – now extremely 
critical of ‘institutional monocropping’ that prescribes solutions ill-
fitted to context; and increasingly emphatic on the need for ‘problem-
driven’ and ‘politically smart’ approaches.29 
In parallel, the UN’s policy staff now make much heavier use of 
think tanks and academic institutions that are better equipped to deal 
with original research (a point that we return to in Part 3 below). The 
questions that are asked have also become much more open-ended, 
with research programs like the ‘Future of Peace Operations’ and ‘Fu-
ture Concepts and Models for Peace Operations’ now common.30  
 
                                                          
peace: A memoir of international peacekeeping in the 21st century’, Brookings Insti-
tution Press, 2015, p266. 
29  Andrews A, Pritchett L and Woolcock A, ‘Escaping capability traps through problem-
driven iterative adaptation’, Center for Global Development, Working Paper No. 
299, 2012; Booth D and Unsworth S, ‘Politically smart, locally led development’, 
Overseas Development Institute, 2014; Autesserre, S, ‘Peaceland: Conflict resolu-
tion and the everyday politics of international intervention’, Cambridge University 
Press, 2014.  
30  These are programmes of the Henry L. Stimson Center and the International Forum 
for the Challenges of Peace Operations, respectively. 
 2. Country strategies 
2.1 The learning challenge 
In 2010, Lakhdar Brahimi looked back on a long career as the UN’s 
most celebrated trouble-shooter to recall that that the organisation ‘is 
often taking very serious decisions about how to respond to crises it 
does not know enough about.’31 His point was that multi-dimensional 
peacekeeping implied a steep learning curve for both the design and 
the successful execution of individual operations. 
Returning to the example of the DRC, early mandates tasked 16,000 
uniformed personnel to protect civilians across a territory of 2.35 mil-
lion square kilometres. (Later mandates dropped this to ‘only’ 400,000 
square kilometres of difficult terrain.) As one former head of mission 
has put it, successful execution thus depended wholly upon good strat-
egy to ‘match, or at least reconcile, means and mandates’.32 This in 
turn required a deep understanding of security and political dynamics 
on the ground, with successive crises in Ituri, Bukavu, and Goma 
providing pointed reminders of the high stakes of getting it wrong. 
A similar story can be told for peace operations in Sierra Leone, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Darfur, and a half-dozen other cases. As a 2010 lessons 
learned note summarised, they face a set of policy dilemmas that can 
be dimly seen in the abstract, but brought into focus only ‘in light of 
the particular circumstances of each mission, given the context-specific 
challenges that missions face’.33 These include managing relationships 
with parties to the conflict; effective information-gathering; and the 
proactive allocation and reallocation of resources to meet multiple po-
tential threats. 
The design problem was no more straightforward for the new ‘early 
peacebuilding’ mandates. There is increasingly emphatic recognition at 
the inter-governmental level that such interventions ‘must reflect the 
unique conditions and needs of the country rather than be driven by 
what international actors can or want to supply’.34 Early evaluations of 
                                                          
31  Brahimi L, ‘Contribution to the General Assembly debate on peacekeeping’, August 
2010. Cited in Benner et al, ‘The new world of UN peace operations’, above, p213. 
32  Doss A, ‘Great expectations: UN peacekeeping, civilian protection, and the use of 
force’, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Research Series No. 4, 2011. 
33  United Nations, ‘DPKO / DFS lessons learned note on the protection of civilians in 
UN peacekeeping operations: Dilemmas, practices and emerging lessons’, Depart-
ment of Peacekeeping Operations / Department of Field Support, January 2010. 
34  United Nations, ‘Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict’, above, para 
16. 
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UN peace operations’ support to the rule of law, police and military 
reform found major shortcomings in this regard. They detailed inter-
ventions that took scant account of local political priorities, and were 
often premised on very superficial understandings of local institu-
tions.35 The g7+, a group of countries designated as ‘fragile’ by their 
partners, have likewise excoriated international interventions as ‘often 
inapplicable, unsustainable and incompatible with our in-country na-
tional agendas’.36  
The managerial challenge is thus clear: To develop context-
appropriate strategies that can attract the buy-in of key stakeholders. 
Of course, this is made more difficult by the fact that peace operations 
tend to deploy at precisely the moment when national institutions are 
most fragmented and politicised. As a recent review of the Peacebuild-
ing Commission’s work has noted, this means trying to ascertain the 
‘unique conditions and needs of the country’ in a context where ‘the 
capacity and will to exercise full national ownership may be con-
strained because ... a stable political order is yet to be established’.37  
A second complicating factor is the need to find common ground 
with a confusing array of international actors. UN peace operations 
may now be early peacebuilders, but are ‘neither designed nor 
equipped to engage in longer-term institution and capacity-building 
efforts’.38 Their big-picture effectiveness thus depends upon joint learn-
ing, and the corresponding strategic design, with actors that have com-
plementary capabilities. The latter include (among others!) the devel-
opmental and human rights components of the UN system, bilateral 
diplomatic and aid actors, the international financial institutions, and 
other multilateral organisations. 
2.2 Managerial responses 
There has been extensive policy attention to how peace operations 
should analyse the country context and develop viable strategies. This 
includes no fewer than four revisions of official guidance from 2006-
15, each approved by the Secretary-General and also (more recently) 
                                                          
35  See Part 2.2 above. 
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the UN Development Group.39 Taking the long view, the approach that 
has emerged can be summarised under three areas of work. 
(i) Designing new operations 
Faced with the new multi-dimensional mandates, it quickly became the 
norm to establish a dedicated inter-departmental task force for an an-
ticipated peace operation.40 These task forces are chaired by a lead 
department, either the Department of Peacekeeping Operations or the 
Department of Political Affairs. They were initially conceptualised as a 
‘project management team’ for the start-up process, with responsibility 
to analyse the context, formulate a common position for the UN system, 
and report back to the Security Council with recommendations for a 
mandate. Over time they have evolved to include representatives of ‘all 
relevant United Nations entities’, including the specialised develop-
ment and humanitarian agencies.41  
The assessment and design process historically centred on in-
country joint analyses, originally dubbed Technical Assessment Mis-
sions and recently rebranded as Strategic Assessments. This process 
has always been controversial and much-criticised, a fate that was 
probably unavoidable given the competing value judgments and priori-
ties that hover in the background of any peace operations. Still, succes-
sive course corrections suggest some useful orientations: 
Priorities and options. The tendency to simply add together competing 
agendas into an over-general ‘Christmas tree mandate’ has attracted 
harsh language both internally, and in external reviews such as the 
HIPPO report. In response, more recent policy strongly encourages an 
integrated assessment in which the lead department is explicit about 
the conflict analysis, the priorities flowing from this, and any dissent-
ing points of view within the UN system. Linked with this, recent initia-
tives have encouraged clearer decision points for senior leadership in 
the Secretariat to provide input on basic parameters rather than being 
presented with a ‘fully cooked’ approach. 
Wider and deeper consultation. There is a self-evident need to engage 
with multiple levels of government in the host country, where these are 
                                                          
39  The UN Development Group comprises the UN’s specialised agencies, funds and 
programmes. For policy guidance see: United Nations, ‘Integrated Missions Plan-
ning Process (IMPP): Guidelines endorsed by the Secretary-General’, June 2006; 
United Nations, ‘IMPP Guidelines: Role of the Headquarters’, May 2009; United Na-
tions, ‘IMPP Guidelines: Role of the Field’, January 2010;  United Nations / EOSG, 
‘IMPP Guidelines: Role of the Field’, January 2012; United Nations, ‘Integrated as-
sessment and planning handbook’, IAP Working Group, December 2013. 
40  Integrated Mission Task Force, later Integrated Task Force. 
41  United Nations, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the 
report of the Panel on United Nations peace operations’, October 2000, UN Doc 
A/55/502, paras 49-66; United Nations, ‘Integrated assessment and planning 
handbook’, above.  
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in place. There are also important stakeholders at the inter-govern-
mental level, where failures to engage early with troop-contributing 
countries and interested regional powers have been flagged as raising 
unnecessary tensions. A more recent, but clearly evident, trend is to 
emphasise the need for ‘inclusive’ processes that engage with a broader 
array of political, civil society and community interlocutors.42 
Professionalisation. There have been tentative steps to build a more 
thorough analytic process rather than placing too much weight on a 
brief ‘technical assessment mission’. This includes better utilisation of 
expertise from other parts of the UN system and outside sources, and 
recognition of the need to intersect with key national processes rather 
than working on an UN-dictated timeline. (These include, for example, 
fragility assessments under the New Deal for Conflict-Affected and 
Fragile States; compacts with the Peacebuilding Commission; and 
lending agreements with the international financial institutions.)  
(ii) Country-level decision-making 
Once a peace operation is deployed, the locus of responsibility for gen-
eral management shifts to country level. Doctrinally, heads of mission 
are responsible for revising the strategic framework guiding the United 
Nations system’s activities, and to recommend needed adjustments to 
mission tasks and mandates.43 Practically, they are the principal inter-
locutor of the host nation, the diplomatic community and external 
partner agencies. In most operations, moreover, they are also the only 
point at which the full range of mandate tasks comes together. 
With regard to process: The inter-departmental task force at Head-
quarters level has a counterpart at country level, most recently re-
branded as a Senior Leadership Forum. This body comprises the man-
agement team of the peace operation, and heads of UN agencies with 
local representation. It is responsible to provide ‘strategic direction, 
planning oversight, information-sharing, analysis, coordination and 
monitoring in support of the UN’s peace consolidation efforts’.44 Since 
2006, it is also expected to endorse an ‘integrated strategic framework’ 
(ISF) for the UN system as a whole. This is intended to include a com-
mon analysis of the conflict; definition of peacebuilding priorities; 
                                                          
42  United Nations, ‘Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict’, above, para 
11; United Nations, ‘7143rd meeting of the Security Council’, 19 March 2014, UN 
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mechanisms for follow-up; and approach to monitoring & reporting.45 
Within the peace operation, meanwhile, policy dictates an overarching 
mission concept to tie together the different pillars.  
It must be stressed that the implementation record for all of this is 
very mixed. The planning process set out in official policy has been 
frequently criticised as ‘asking a lot, but adding little’, and the devel-
opment of Integrated Strategic Frameworks and mission concepts has 
been progressive at best. Nonetheless, the adjustments made in succes-
sive generations of policy guidance suggest some clear lessons of expe-
rience.  
Function over form. Early dogfights about how to organise, and who 
reported to whom, obscured the fact that there were broader weakness-
es in strategy. The influential Report on Integrated Missions in 2004 
noted in this regard that it was essential to clarify overarching objec-
tives in order to know which UN activities really needed to be ‘integrat-
ed’. This would both increase effectivenes and avoid sensitivities about 
humanitarian and human rights work being subordinated to political-
security considerations.46  
Later versions of planning guidance have accordingly put much 
greater emphasis on the need for regular joint analysis, consultation 
and stock-taking at the level of senior leadership. They have also been 
considerably less prescriptive on the content and timeline of ISFs and 
mission concepts. As one review put it, there is greater recognition that 
these are ‘mechanisms or processes that facilitate an integrated ap-
proach, not ends in themselves’.47 
Benchmarking and evaluation. Following early initiatives in Sierra Le-
one and Liberia, the use of benchmarks to assess the country situation 
and mandate implementation is now endorsed as a general practice. 
This has led to a handbook on tools and processes, alongside specialist 
guidance on indicators for areas like the rule of law and protection of 
civilians.48 In practice uptake remains limited, with evaluation still 
                                                          
45  United Nations, ‘Note from the Secretary-General: Guidance on Integrated Mis-
sions’, January 2006. This was subsequently updated and revised in 2008, 2011 
and 2013.  
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widely regarded as a significant weakness and few specialist resources 
available for this task at either Headquarters or in the field.49 
(iii) Periodic strategic review 
The principal tool for review and recalibration of deployed peace opera-
tions has been the same ‘technical / strategic assessment’) process. 
Such exercises are sometimes launched on the Secretariat’s own initia-
tive; sometimes at the request of the Security Council prior to renewal 
of mandates; and occasionally at the request of host governments. The 
intent is to supplement the standard narrative and financial reports for 
on-going peace operations with a more holistic look at progress. The 
resulting analysis then feeds into mission-level decision-making, as 
well as adaptation of the mandate and budget at the inter-governmen-
tal level.  
In general, the same complaints and policy adaptations are evident 
for this use of a ‘strategic assessment’ as for its utilisation at the design 
phase of new missions, as discussed above. The main additional issue 
has been the need to respect the delegation of authority to the head of 
mission in the field, an issue that has frequently been contentious.50 
2.3 Takeaways 
The development of robust approaches to analysis and planning has 
been difficult, and led to no small amount of heated debate. The ad-
vantage for the outside observer is that adjustments over time give a 
fairly clear indication of where things have gone wrong. Some of these 
hard-learned lessons are as follows. 
Management, not planning. The first few generations of planning 
guidance envisaged a linear, ‘shoot and forget’ model.51 According to 
this philosophy the Secretary-General would issue a directive with stra-
tegic objectives; headquarters planners would refine this into a strategy 
document; and then draft a mission plan to hand over to the incoming 
head-of-mission.52 It rapidly became clear, however, that this was su-
premely ill-fitted to the operating environment. At the start-up phase, 
missions had to grapple with complex histories and geographies before 
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they could define workable approaches to institution-building and pro-
tection. Once established, they routinely needed to adjust tasks and 
resources in the wake of national political and electoral processes, new 
ceasefires or peace agreements, and major crises. 
The result is that the formal process was rarely followed. Recognis-
ing this, planning frameworks have been progressively re-conceptual-
ised as ‘a regular reference for an on-going field-based process of joint 
analysis and review’.53 This process relies on active steering by mission 
leadership, with the result that management skills have received 
somewhat greater emphasis in senior appointments and training. The 
2015 HIPPO report went still further in calling for a two-stage mandat-
ing process, by which a stabilising core presence would deploy and 
begin to map out mission objectives over the medium term once condi-
tions on the ground became clearer. 
Involve political stakeholders. The lion’s share of strategic manage-
ment properly sits at the field level. It is usually counter-productive to 
open different channels around a head of mission; or for generalists in 
New York to countermand managers who are closer to the issues. Yet it 
is also clear that success in UN peacekeeping depends upon forging 
common intent with Security Council members, troop contributors, the 
General Assembly, and other international agencies.  
The consequence is a two-level system for strategic management 
that is ‘painful, but probably essential’, as a 2012 assessment put it.54 
In this system Headquarters-level teams work to avoid decision-making 
in the field becoming disconnected from essential political support. 
This role is particularly important where decisions are needed at the 
inter-governmental level, as is the case for changes in the mandate (via 
the Security Council), financial resources (via the General Assembly), 
or military resources (via troop contributors). 
Recognise external dependencies. Early planning models were heav-
ily criticised for a closed, production-type approach that simply did not 
match up well with an environment comprising many different part-
ners. This led to enormous tensions around the issue of humanitarian 
space, with fears that peace operations were attempting to dictate how 
such assistance would be delivered. There were also many notable fail-
ures of communication with development agencies, with peacekeeping 
plans developed in splendid isolation from key processes such as Post-
Conflict Needs Assessments (conducted by the international financial 
institutions) and Fragility Assessments (under the New Deal for Fragile 
and Conflict-Affected States).  
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Later iterations have progressively clarified the scope of ‘integration’ 
to exclude the humanitarian work of the United Nations, which re-
mains within its conventional channels, and to make more modest de-
mands upon development agencies. This has led to much greater flexi-
bility around the form and timeline of products at country level, in con-
sequence of the greater number of variables that have to be taken into 
account. Crucially, they have also put more emphasis on soft skills and 
good process leadership. As one former SRSG has put it, there is no 
alternative to a patient and participatory approach in a system where 
key partners report to their own executive boards and funding partners, 
and where the authority of the Secretary-General is more moral than 
practical.55 
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 3. Learning infrastructure 
3.1 The learning challenge 
We have already seen that the rapid growth of multi-dimensional peace 
operations throughout the first decade of the 2000s presented a steep 
learning curve. Managers in Sierra Leone and the DRC had to develop 
viable concepts of operations for the protection of civilians as they 
went; interim administrations took over day-to-day governance in Ti-
mor-Leste and Kosovo with almost no in-house expertise on their poli-
tics or history. 
There was little alternative to this in the short run, but it was clearly 
necessary to capture the UN’s growing institutional experience and 
make better use of it. Early needs assessments drove home the point: 
 A 2004 survey of field staff found that 50% felt they had to rec-
reate guidance (or ‘reinvent the wheel’) ‘all the time’ or ‘very of-
ten’. Meanwhile 46% said they had received no guidance mate-
rials or briefings whatsoever upon starting their current job.56  
 The first-ever training needs assessment for UN peacekeeping 
found that just 19% of civilian staff had received pre-
deployment training of any kind. Less than half of military per-
sonnel who had received pre-deployment training, and less 
than a third of civilians, felt that such training was useful for 
their day-to-day jobs. 
 Evaluations of early ‘multi-dimensional’ operations, notably in 
Timor-Leste and Kosovo, emphasised that personnel deploying 
into missions had to ‘find their own way’ without any UN-
provided training or guidance.57 
In response, the incoming Under-Secretary General for the Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations set out to transform it, in his phrase, into a 
‘learning organisation’.58 The internal ‘Peace Operations 2010’ reform 
agenda articulated this to mean a ‘strong culture of continuous institu-
tional development and knowledge transfer’, with the specific ambition 
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that ‘collective experience be captured and put to use each time a new 
mission is launched or when a mission is expected to engage in new 
tasks’.59 
Realising this ambition required confronting some hard realities. 
First and foremost was the heavily decentralised nature of UN peace 
operations. The starting point for learning initiatives had to be an ac-
knowledgment that accumulated knowledge and practices were over-
whelmingly to be found in the field. This meant that the primary ‘value 
add’ of Headquarters involvement, at least at the early stages, would be 
to help capture and transfer that experience. Steps beyond this to gen-
erate common approaches and policies had to be cautious ones, given 
the many differences between individual peace operations and the en-
vironments that they worked in. Stated otherwise, the organisation had 
to keep in balance ‘thematic’ expertise on common peacekeeping tasks 
(discussed in Part 1 of this paper) with the acknowledged primacy of 
country-specific strategy (discussed in Part 2). 
The second and closely related point was the very limited human re-
sources capacity at UN Headquarters. In 2000 the Brahimi report found 
a Headquarters presence that accounted for a scant two percent of the 
total cost of UN peacekeeping. This inevitably meant that priority was 
given to operational needs, with staff not ‘able to do more than keep 
existing missions afloat’. To take two notable examples in the early 
2000s, the ratio of personnel in Criminal Law and Judicial Support Unit 
to their counterparts in the field was about 1:200; and the comparable 
ratio for the Police Division’s Policy and Planning Unit was 1:2000.60 
Given that both units had responsibilities for planning and recruit-
ment, they were fully occupied by the rapid-fire deployment and draw-
down of peace operations during the early 2000s. Other potential con-
tributors, notably the small Policy Analysis and Best Practices Unit, 
had fared no better for resources, and were likewise fully occupied with 
day-to-day demands.61  
A third obstacle to a genuine ‘learning organisation’ was perhaps 
the most intractable. As one comprehensive review has put it, any such 
initiative was ‘fragile because of extreme turnover – on average, civil-
ian staff stay for less than four years while military and police person-
nel are generally on six- to twelve-month deployments’.62 This posed 
enormous practical difficulties for training and on-the-job develop-
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ment; and limited the incentives for staff to themselves contribute to 
the institutional knowledge base.  
3.2 Managerial responses  
Over time, the ambition to become a ‘learning organisation’ has been 
supported by three complementary lines of effort: 
(i) Headquarters policy capacity 
From the rather low starting point of 2000, there are now a number of 
policy teams that help identify and disseminate good practices, develop 
organisation-wide policy guidance, and provide technical backstop-
ping to colleagues in the field. Among the more important are: 
 The Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, established 
in 2007. This includes specialist staffing for judicial support; 
security sector reform; corrections; and disarmament, demobi-
lisation and reintegration.  
 Teams within the Peacekeeping Best Practices Service for the-
matic areas such as Civil Affairs, the protection of civilians, and 
gender. 
 Some reinvigoration of the policy functions of the Police Divi-
sion (within OROLSI) and the Military Planning Service (within 
the Office of the Military advisor).  
 A small team on overall planning for peace operations, alt-
hough this is widely acknowledged as a continuing weakness. 
The gradual evolution of the work of these units has been summarised 
in Part 1, above. It is important to note that in most cases they are em-
bedded in forums to help gather inter-departmental and external per-
spectives, such as the Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group; 
and the Integrated Assessment and Planning Working Group. 
(ii) Peer-peer knowledge sharing 
There has been a considerable drive to capture and disseminate know-
ledge and practices closer to their points of origin in the field. One no-
table early initiative was the ‘knowledge toolbox’ comprising models 
for end-of-assignment-reports; after-action-reviews; handover notes; 
and surveys of practice.63 This was accompanied by the deployment of 
a dedicated Best Practices Officer into larger missions and part-time 
focal points into smaller ones, as service providers to help capture ex-
periences and to gather relevant lessons learned from other operations. 
Over time this has led to a modest library available to staff via an online 
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Resource Hub. An additional enabling tool are the online ‘communities 
of practice’, organised by thematic area and with a staff member acting 
as (part-time) facilitator. These forums aim to provide advice on a real-
time basis via a direct question-and-answer format.  
The level of utilisation of these knowledge-sharing processes has 
varied significantly between different thematic areas and peace opera-
tions, depending on occupational cultures and the skills of facilitators. 
(Areas like political and civil affairs, in which drafting and reporting 
already play central roles, have been the most fruitful; areas like civil-
ian policing much less so.) The products of the ‘knowledge toolbox’ 
have also been skewed heavily towards senior staff, where in-mission 
Best Practices staff has tended to prioritise their support. 
Later UN policy has tried to broaden uptake by exhorting managers 
to create a ‘conducive environment’ for staff to spend time and energy 
on knowledge-sharing, and directing them to incorporate this criterion 
into staff performance assessments. It has also instructed staff to begin 
‘any new significant activity’ with an examination of existing practice; 
and to mandatorily conduct after-action reviews for certain activities 
and events.64  
(iii) ‘On-boarding’ training 
It is widely recognised that peacekeeping training remains under-
developed. The main steps have been the formation of the Headquar-
ters-level Integrated Training Service; and global needs assessments in 
2008-09 and 2012-13 to examine how this office should orient its 
work.65 Both have focused, due to very limited resources, on the points 
at which personnel enter into service in individual peace operations. 
Measures in this regard have included:  
 Delivery of pre-deployment training for civilian personnel; and 
of induction training for both civilian and uniformed personnel. 
This has focused on ‘cross-cutting’ short-course programmes 
delivered in common for all staff.66 
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 Materials and advice for pre-deployment training by member 
states who provide military contingents and formed police 
units. (The General Assembly has urged ‘coherence and a com-
mon view of responsibilities’, but stopped short of endorsing 
the idea of mandatory common standards.67) There has also 
been some institutional collaboration with the International As-
sociation of Peacekeeping Training Centres. 
 Development of a limited range of specialised training courses 
on topics including child protection; tactical-level protection of 
civilians; and military command-and control.  
 Several dedicated courses for incoming senior managers, com-
prising the Senior Leadership Programme and the SMART pro-
gramme for mission support functions. An additional course for 
potential leadership appointments (the SML programme) is de-
livered through a number of different providers.  
Training beyond this – notably professional education and leadership 
development – remains the responsibility of individual managers. 
However the budgets for this purpose are small, and the results to date 
limited.68  
3.3 Takeaways 
The UN Secretariat operates in a perhaps uniquely complex manage-
ment environment. The consequence is that building up its learning 
infrastructure was a gradual, and carefully negotiated, process. Two 
particular lessons bear emphasis. 
The first is the need for good stakeholder engagement. The ex-
panded ambitions that the Security Council began to define for peace 
operations from 1999 onwards did not enjoy universal support, and 
tensions between the Council and the member states of the General 
Assembly frequently played out through the budgetary process.  
This was particularly evident for sensitive areas such as judicial and 
security sector reform, which touched directly upon core sovereign 
responsibilities.69 It took three annual budget cycles to get two policy 
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staff in place for rule of law institutions; and three more before the pol-
icy products discussed in Part 1 began to flow in earnest. Throughout 
this process the Secretariat’s top leadership played a very active role in 
consulting with member states and pressing the agenda forward. A first 
major step included a Report of the Secretary-General in 2004 on the 
Rule of Law and Transitional Justice which defined the scope of peace 
operations’ work and what key policy products would eventually look 
like. This was followed by the negotiation of a paragraph endorsing 
strengthened Secretariat capacity in this area in the outcome document 
of the 2005 World Summit (involving some 170 member states).70 
Conversely, there are many examples of policy initiatives that failed, 
or were heavily delayed, due to inadequate consultation. Part 2 of this 
paper has already provided a cautionary tale in this regard. Early itera-
tions of policy guidance for strategic planning were developed in-house 
with scant consultation. They almost immediately ran into resistance 
from UN agencies, funds and programmes, and on occasion from host-
country governments. Member states meanwhile remained uncon-
vinced, and declined to support additional budgeted posts for profes-
sional planners at Headquarters. The net result is that rollout remained 
limited, with a little correspondence between formal policy require-
ments and practice in the field. 
A second lesson is that the UN’s learning infrastructure has gradual-
ly evolved into a network effort. The efforts of the two principal de-
partments (Peacekeeping and Field Support) have been heavily sup-
plemented by:  
 Input into the training programmes of member states providing 
military, police and civilian personnel, and support to third-
party training institutes via the IAPTC network (noted above). 
 Utilisation of outside think tanks as external repositories of UN 
peacekeeping experience. These institutions have provided fre-
quent original research and occasional drafting support; facili-
tated exchanges between peacekeeping staff and subject-matter 
experts on high-priority topics; and hosted many senior offi-
cials for reflection and writing after their tenure with the UN 
had come to an end.71  
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 Reliance on financial contributions from individual member 
states to underwrite policy development in specific areas. This 
has allowed the Secretariat to tap outside expertise on a con-
tract basis.  
Use of joint working groups and planning teams to tap institutional 
memory and expertise of other agencies within the UN system, and to a 
lesser extent the international financial institutions. 
 
 Conclusion 
UN peacekeeping’s overarching learning challenge from 2000-15 can 
be summarised very simply: getting better at multidimensional opera-
tions. The huge jump in size and complexity from the operation in An-
gola to that in the Congo now reflects the ‘new normal’, with similar 
approaches tried in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Timor-Leste, Liberia, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Haiti, and a half-dozen other crises. In the early years, manag-
ers found themselves scrambling to meet new and unfamiliar demands, 
with the Brahimi Report’s warning that previous peace operations had 
‘repeatedly failed’ lurking in the background.  
What practical advice can we glean from this hard-won experience, 
for other organisations engaged in peacekeeping and peacebuilding? 
What lessons are there for the UN itself, with expectations for its opera-
tions now expanding to encompass the aggressive use of force and 
suppressing violent extremism? 
A first point, and a fundamental one, concerns where to focus. This 
paper has organised a great number of different initiatives under three 
broad lines of effort, with the aim of underlining the fact that these 
must be kept in balance. To quickly recapitulate: 
 System-level learning was essential for tasks that were, apart 
from anything else, new to the organisation. An early focus on 
‘best practices’ had to give way to the recognition that what 
worked for peace operations was often very unclear, or very 
controversial.  
 Mission-level learning does not happen automatically. The 
HIPPO report’s strongest recommendation was that ‘politics 
must have primacy’. This underlined the need for a flexible 
management model that responded effectively to the context, 
rather than relying on Headquarters-led formal planning. 
 Dedicated resources for learning are indispensable. Peace oper-
ations are by their nature crisis-driven. It is easy for operational 
pressures to crowd out attention to learning, and this has hap-
pened over long periods at both country-level and system-level. 
Within each of these lines of effort, there is also important learning on 
how to execute. In formulating policy goals such as the ‘learning or-
ganisation’, or integrated mission planning, the UN drew overtly on 
models from other sectors and presumed global ‘best practices’. Yet 
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these ran almost immediately into some rather unyielding realities of 
the UN’s environment, namely:  
 Complex stakeholder relationships. Peace operations depend 
for their success upon the alignment of host-country interlocu-
tors, interested foreign governments, and inter-governmental 
institutions. Approaches that could not attract widespread sup-
port in this environment were unviable, whatever their paper 
merits. 
 A unique operating model. ‘What worked’ could only be deter-
mined with reference to the UN’s highly particular systems for 
assessed funding; for sourcing civilian and military personnel; 
and for coordinating with its specialised agencies. 
In these two senses, the takeaways noted in previous sections reflect 
progressive adjustments to ‘how things work around here’. These ad-
justments usually occurred after fierce criticism of early initiatives from 
practitioners in the field, from key political stakeholders, and from ex-
ternal experts. Taken as a whole, they sketch the path that the UN 
muddled along towards ‘best-fit’ approaches for its particular circum-
stances.  
All this sounds daunting – and it is. There is no avoiding the fact 
that UN peacekeeping is at the upper end of difficulty for organisation-
al learning, as for many other management challenges. This leads us to 
a third and final observation, about sequencing and prioritisation. 
On this point opinions must vary, yet there are two facts worth bearing 
in mind.  
The first is that the natural centre of gravity for innovation is in the 
field. Mission staff outnumbers their Headquarters counterparts by 
about 100:1; and moreover are under everyday pressure to solve prac-
tical problems. As a result, practice has consistently run a long way 
ahead of doctrine.72 The second fact is that this same apparatus is per-
haps uniquely vulnerable to forgetting innovations. Peace operations 
are ‘temporary and ad hoc by nature, contracts are often short term, 
training opportunities are limited, and, consequently, staff turnover is 
high’.73  
The policy consequence follows: The perfect may be the enemy of 
the good. The conceptual barriers are very high for doctrinal clarity on 
issues like early peacebuilding and international protection of civilians. 
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As one early enthusiast of current approaches to peacekeeping exit 
strategy admitted in a mea culpa some years later:74 
Too often ... problems are misdiagnosed as coordination failures be-
cause they manifest themselves, superficially, as disorderliness or 
ineffectiveness in the field, whereas in fact they reflect deeper frus-
trations, tensions and uncertainties in the enterprise. 
Efforts to manage these tensions and uncertainties are at the edge of 
innovation in international development circles, and within inter-
governmental processes like the International Dialogue on Peacebuild-
ing and Statebuilding. It is not easy to keep abreast of such trends, let 
alone train widely dispersed staff to do likewise. Yet there are plenty of 
practical steps that do not require this. UN Peacekeeping has made 
considerable headway over the last fifteen years in clarifying its recur-
ring tasks, how they have been approached in the past, and where 
peace operations’ comparative advantages actually lie. This has permit-
ted, in turn, the articulation of minimum standards and the dissemina-
tion of practical tools across a number of key areas. These are innova-
tions can be replicated with considerable benefit of hindsight, and with 
rapid impact for practitioners in the field. 
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